MDPPACPB Regulations

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(a) 
Compelling independent fuel retailers to purchase non-fuel 
products such as lubricants, branded uniforms, point-of-sale systems as a 
condition for fuel supply, where those products are independently available; 
 
(b) 
Requiring a buyer who wishes to purchase Product A (for example 
petrol) to also purchase Product B (e.g., diesel or branded additives) in fixed 
or tied quantities; 
 
(c) 
Offering pipeline transport plus storage plus wholesale supply as a 
bundle, where the discounted price of the bundle undercuts the standalone 
cost of any single service, making it uneconomical for customers to deal with 
competitors offering only a subset; 
 
(d) 
Tying retail branding or franchise access to exclusive contracts for 
other services or supplies that could be competitively sourced. 
(4) Permissible Bundling 
Tying or bundling may be permitted only if the licensee can demonstrate that: 
 
(a) 
The arrangement results in substantial efficiencies, cost savings, or 
quality improvements that benefit the buyer; 
 
(b) 
The bundling is genuinely optional, with transparent unbundled 
prices offered for each component; 
 
(c) 
It does not foreclose a substantial portion of the market for the tied 
product or service. 
 
 
17. Loyalty Rebates and Minimum Volume Commitments 
    1.    Prohibition 
No licensee or supplier in the midstream or downstream petroleum sector shall 
implement or enforce loyalty rebate schemes, fidelity discounts, or minimum 
volume commitments that have the object or effect of inducing exclusivity or 
quasi-exclusivity, thereby restricting customer freedom to source from 
alternative suppliers and substantially lessening competition. 
(2) Presumptively Anti-Competitive Practices 
The following practices shall be presumed anti-competitive, particularly when 
adopted by a licensee: 
 
(a) 
Offering loyalty or fidelity rebates that require buyers to source 
most or all their needs from the supplier in order to qualify for the rebate; 
 
(b) 
Imposing retroactive rebates that apply to past purchases once a 
total volume threshold is met, thereby creating a financial penalty for switching 
to a competitor mid-period; 
 
(c) 
Setting minimum annual purchase commitments so high that they 
effectively prevent the buyer from doing business with any other supplier; 
 
(d) 
Using non-linear discount structures with sharp cliffs, such that a 
small reduction in volume results in disproportionate loss of discount. 
(3) Permissible Schemes 
Volume-based discounts or commitments may be permissible where: 
 
(a) 
Discounts are linearly proportional to actual volume or 
documented cost savings; 
 
(b) 
The terms are non-exclusive, and customers retain meaningful 
access to competing suppliers;