MDPPACPB Regulations

Page 33 of 127
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(b) The Authority shall determine dominance or significant market power 
based on: Market share, capacity control, access to infrastructure, contractual 
networks, or other structural indicators.  
 
4. 
Burden of Proof 
The burden of proving that the conduct is objectively justified or pro-
competitive shall rest with the licensee or permit holder alleged to have 
engaged in the exclusionary conduct. 
 
5. 
Enforcement 
Any licensee found in breach of this Regulation shall be subject to: 
Administrative penalties as provided under XVII of these Regulations; Orders for 
cessation or modification of the conduct; Structural remedies or divestiture, 
where necessary to restore competition. 
 
29. Prohibition of Collective Refusal to Deal and Coordinated Boycott Practices 
(1) Prohibition:  
No Licensee, whether individually or in concert with others, shall engage in any 
practice or behaviour that has the object or effect of collectively refusing to 
deal with, or denying access to, any competitor, including new entrants, in a 
manner that substantially lessens competition or distorts market access in the 
midstream and downstream petroleum industry. 
(2) Concerted Boycott and Coordinated Conduct:  
Without prejudice to the generality of subregulation 1 of this Regulation, it shall 
be unlawful for two or more Licensees or Operators, whether directly or 
indirectly: 
(a) To jointly or in parallel, refuse to supply, lease, allow access to, or otherwise 
transact with any competitor, including independent importers, marketers, or 
new entrants requiring access to critical petroleum infrastructure such as jetties, 
storage depots, pipelines, or transportation facilities; 
(b) To adopt or implement concerted actions or coordinated strategies 
whether formal or informal, written or oral that result in a pattern of 
simultaneous or near-simultaneous denial of access, suspension of supply, or 
exclusion of a competitor without legitimate, objective, and commercially 
justifiable grounds; 
(c) To engage in or facilitate practices, through trade associations, third 
parties, or other indirect means, that encourage or reinforce a collective 
refusal to deal with a specific competitor or class of competitors. 
(3) Assessment of Conduct:  
In assessing conduct under this Regulation, the Authority shall consider 
whether: 
(a) There exists a discernible pattern of coordinated or parallel refusals among 
major operators to transact with the affected party; 
(b) The refusal to deal is not based on objectively verifiable commercial criteria 
such as demonstrable credit risk, proven operational incapacity, or 
documented safety concerns; 
(c) The conduct, even absent explicit agreements, has the effect of 
substantially lessening competition or erecting barriers to entry in the relevant 
market.