Library / PETROLEUM INDUSTRY ACT, NO. 6, 2021 MIDSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM PETROLEUM PREVENTION OF ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES AND BEHAVIOUR REGULATIONS, 2026 ARRANGEMENT OF REGULATIONS

PETROLEUM INDUSTRY ACT, NO. 6, 2021 MIDSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM PETROLEUM PREVENTION OF ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES AND BEHAVIOUR REGULATIONS, 2026 ARRANGEMENT OF REGULATIONS

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(a) Monitor digital platform operations within the midstream and downstream 
petroleum sectors; 
(b) Require dominant digital service providers to publish platform access 
criteria, interoperability protocols, and non-discrimination policies; 
(c) Investigate complaints of exclusionary digital conduct and, where 
appropriate, order interim measures, impose administrative penalties, or 
mandate interoperability or access remedies. 
(6) Reporting Obligation 
 Any licensee operating a digital platform serving more than 10% of market 
participants or consumers in a relevant product or geographic market shall 
annually report to the Authority, disclosing: 
(a) The number of third-party participants or users; 
(b) Access criteria and technical integration requirements; 
(c) Any refusals or suspensions of access and the reasons therefor. 
 
33. Regulation of Algorithmic and Artificial Intelligence (AI)-Based Pricing 
 
1. 
Permitted Use 
Algorithmic or artificial intelligence (AI)-based systems pricing tools are 
permitted  to set or adjust prices in the midstream and downstream petroleum 
industry, provided such systems are not used deliberately or inadvertently in a 
manner that facilitates anticompetitive behaviour, price coordination, or 
collusive outcomes. 
(2) Prohibited Conduct and Outcomes:  
A licensee shall be deemed to have engaged in anticompetitive conduct if its 
algorithmic pricing systems: 
(a) Cause prices to adjust in a coordinated manner with competitors without 
independent business justification; 
(b) Are designed or allowed to follow competitor price signals automatically; 
(c) Rely on shared third-party software or inputs known to produce 
synchronized or stable high-price outcomes; 
(d) Result in conscious parallelism that mirrors the effects of a price-fixing 
agreement, including price stability not explained by market fundamentals. 
(3) Duty to Program for Compliance 
 Every licensee using algorithmic pricing tools shall: 
(a) Ensure that the algorithms are designed and regularly tested to comply with 
the Act, Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act and these 
Regulations; 
(b) Maintain sufficient human oversight and intervention protocols to override 
any collusive effects or feedback loops; 
(c) Avoid reliance on pricing systems that react primarily to the price 
movements of competitors without reference to the costs of the licensee, 
market strategy, or independent parameters. 
(4) Presumption of Tacit Collusion by means of Algorithms  
Where multiple competitors adopt the same or similar pricing software or AI 
systems and such adoption results in non-competitive market outcomes such 
as persistent high prices or synchronized changes without communication this